Geo-politics, China and Africa

Image source PAOLO WOODS

Chinese engagement in Africa is a challenge to the traditional external powers which have dominated African trade, investment and security for the last 100 odd years. France for example, has in many respects continued to dominate her former colonies, providing investment to key economic sectors, remained the main trading partner and has in many cases provided military support to Francophone countries across Africa. The rapid upswing in Chinese investment and trade over the last decade has challenged this status quo, and has redefined the political and economic landscape of Africa in the process.

Often for the first time Western firms face real competition for mineral and oil rights in countries they previously monopolised. China has now taken over the US and EU as Africa's biggest trading partner, worth roughly USD 100 billion a year in 2010. While Chinese investment in Africa is very difficult to measure it has definitely increased rapidly along with trade over the last decade and now probably outstrips the investments made by the World Bank. The result of all this trade and investment is that it gives China a great deal of influence across the continent. African governments will take heed of Beijing's opinion on political and economic matters whether they are internal or external. So if the Chinese government propose a special export zone in Mauritius, the government will pull out all the stops to assist the deal, knowing the benefits further Chinese investment could bring, and if Beijing requests for support at an international forum, such as the UN, an African country with strong Chinese trade ties, they would certainly listen to the Chinese position very carefully.

However it is easy to overstate Chinese influence in the continent, other outside powers retain strong historical links with African countries which will not disappear overnight. China still has relatively weak links with much of the continent as much of its trade and investment is still concentrated on particular countries such as Sudan, Angola and South Africa. Trade relationships work two ways, so an African country exporting goods to China gives the exporting country a certain amount of leverage over China, for instance it could theoretically halt the export of oil, disrupting Chinese supplies. So an nuanced observer of Chinese African relations would see that it is instructive to look at relations between China and individual countries and realise that these relations are often multifaceted and certainly not do follow the simple model of neo-imperialist China dominating a impoverished African country.

One area in particular where China has not sought to build influence in Africa (so far), is in military and security matters, this is partly a result of the "non-interference" policy, which is, I believe, is doomed in the longer run. But for now it is a brake on China getting directly involved in the internal affairs of African countries. Whereas the UK or France could consider sanctions against a country whose policies it opposed - see Zimbabwe, China would never take such direct action, behind the scenes diplomacy, of course, but nothing that would give the impression of direct interference. This was confirmed in one of the "Wikileaks" emails from a senior US diplomat in Lagos, explaining that the US sees China as an economic and political rival on the continent rather than a military and security one.

China's influence varies from country to country across the continent, China is perceived to have considerable sway over Angola, so much so it was recently reported that Angola was seeking to build bridges with other powers such as India and Brazil in order to diverse away from China and avoid overdependence on one country.

It has been widely reported that China has a considerable influence in Sudan, and there has been a lot of speculation in the UK press that pressure should or could be applied on Beijing, which in turn could pressurise the Sudanese government to end the conflict in Darfur. China clearly has some influence on Sudan, thanks to its oil interests there, but its leverage is not clear cut, it is not necessarily a given that it can exert pressure on the Khartoum regime. An interesting test of the non-interference policy and China's influence may come during in the aftermath of the Southern Sudan independence vote in January 2011. Beijing has made strong connections with the Juba Government and would accept the formation of a new state. However in the event of a conflict breaking out between the two sides, certainly not an impossibility, would the Chinese back the North and the status quo, but risk attacks on their oil interests in the South (which occurred in the civil war), or would it back the Southern government hoping to protect its oil interests, or most likely attempt mediation and neutrality. The aftermath of the referendum will test China's non-interference policy as it may not be clear whether the South becoming independent is legal, if the validity of the referendum is challenged, or even if the South secedes - the settlement over oil revenues could still cause war. This could be the first major test of the non-interference policy and given Sudan is Africa's biggest country; the referendum will be watched with interest across the world.

As awareness grows of the African growth story, more European companies will be tempted to be do business in Africa; other rising powers such as India and Brazil have growing interests in Africa, and the continents's supply of minerals and oil will always continue to attract outside interest. If there is a long term increase in commodity prices, then securing African supplies could become very important. Many commentators believe the scene is set for a new scramble for Africa, involving China, Japan, India, European countries, Brazil and the United States, clashing for scarce resources in the 21st century.